UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


Jean-Jacques  Rousseau 
A  Forerunner  of  Pragmatism 


By 

Albert  Schinz 


Reprinted,  with  additions,  from  "The  Monist,"  October.  1909 
(All  rights  reserved.) 


Pais  jai  vu  que  I'homme  a  besoin  de  pen- 
s6es  ^troites Renan  "Le  pr^tre  de  Nemi" 


THE    OPEN   COURT   COMPANY. 

PUBLISHERS. 

86.  STRAND.  LONDON.  W.C.  2. 

1909 


-/   O  o 


S^3 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PACK 

Foreword   iii 

Definition  of  Pragmatism  {j^ 

The  Scientific  Phase  of  Rousseau's  Thought  2 

The  Physio-psychological  Phase   ^J 

The  Pragmatic  Phase  lo 

Three  Characteristic  Applications  of  Pragmatic  Principles  (ay 

Appendix  I :  Rousseau  and  Condillac  34 

Appendix  II :  Rousseau  and  Madame  de  Genlis  37 

Appendix  III :  An  Unknown  Phase  of  Rousseau's  Thought 38 


1 


FOREWORD. 

IN  a  book  written  by  the  author  of  this  pamphlet,  mention  is  made 
of  Rousseau  in  the  following  terms:  "The  greatest  pragmatist 
of  all  times  was — and  probably  will  remain — J.- J.  Rousseau"  (cf. 
Anti-Pragmatisme,  pp.  162-168).  This  affirmation  was  well  worth 
the  fuller  development  given  it  in  the  following  pages.  It  deserved 
it  not  only  because  pragmatism  happens  to  be  now  a  timely  topic 
of  discussion,  but  because  an  examination  of  the  pragmatic  prin- 
ciples contained  in  Rousseau  leads  us  to  the  very  heart  of  his  entire 
philosophy.  There  you  get  the  key,  both  to  the  Utopian  loftiness  of 
his  moral  ideals,  and  to  his  hopeless  inconsistencies ;  both  to  the  great 
influence  of  his  social  doctrines  even  to  our  own  days,  and  to  the 
stubborn  resistance  opposed  to  his  principles  by  the  consistently  in- 
tellectual minds  of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries. 

A  few  references  are  made  to  the  French  edition  of  Anti-Prag- 
matisme (Paris,  Alcan,  1909),  of  which  an  English  edition  will 
soon  appear. 

Albert  Schinz. 

Bryn  Mawr  College. 


/ 


i 


V 


db^-^lp 


/Fl 


y 


JEAN  JACQUES  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF 
PRAGMATISM. 

I  DEFINE  jgragmatism  as  a  philosophy  that  judges  of^  \ 
the  value  of  theories  and  ideas  from  their  consequences/ 
i.  e.,  from  the  practical  results  which  they  yield  to  the 
thinker  when  he  proceeds  to  apply  them  tp  reality.^  ^ 

Pragmatic  results  may  be  understood  as  scientific  re- 
sults ;  but  in  this  case  it  becomes  obvious  that  pragmatism 
is  only  another  word  for  science,  and  hardly  worth  re- 
taining our  attention.  Of  course  we  consider,  and  man 
has  always  considered,  true  or  satisfactory,  a  law  or  an 
idea  which  yields  results,  and  none  else ;  and  if  a  law  or  an 
idea  explains  nothing  or  accounts  for  nothing,  it  is  given 
up.  So  this  scientific  pragmatism  is  not,  cannot  be,  what 
pragmatists  have  in  mind,  for  they  would  not  have  started 
a  new  philosophical  school  to  say  something  that  nobody 
ever  denied,  the  very  thing  and  the  only  thing  which  all  sci- 
entific, philosophical,  theological  minds  have  always  agreed 
upon  since  the  dawn  of  conscious  thinking.  Of  course 
William  James  says,  "a  new  name  for  an  old  thing" ;  still 
we  have  too  high  an  opinion  of  Professor  James  and  others 
who  followed  him  to  believe  that  the  "old  thing"  was  the 
commonplace  truth  which  the  world  has  owned  so  long,  " 
and  which  science  in  our  epoch  is  applying  so*  frantically 
everywhere.  Or  else,  one  might  just  as  well  start  a  new 
system  of  astronomy  to  prove  that  the  sun  shines  at  noon 
and  remains  invisible  at  night. 

There  is  only  one  alternative:  if  pragmatic  results  do 


2  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

not  mean  scientific  results,  they  must  mean  practical  results 
from  the  point  of  view  of  "practical  reason"  as  opposed 
to  ''pure  reason,"  in  other  words,  ethical  results.  And  if 
this  is  what  pragmatism  means,  then  everybody  will  grant 
that  there  is  something  relatively  new  in  it,  in  so  far  as 
there  was  never  before  so  bold  an  attempt  to  reduce  phi- 
losophy to  moral  philosophy ;  or,  I  should  rather  say,  that 
never  could  an  attempt  appear  so  bold,  since  we  live  in  a  sci- 
entific era  when  strictly  scientific  results  alone  are  recog- 
nized by  scholars,  while  ethical  or  esthetic  preoccupations 
are  considered  among  them  as  intruding  elements. 

So  the  whole  quarrel  about  pragmatism  originates  from 
the  vagueness  of  the  word  "result,"  or  "practical  value"; 
the  pragmatists  endeavoring  to  make  modern  philosophy 
adopt  ethical  pragmatism  instead  of  scientific  pragmatism; 
and  as  they  are  entirely  different  things,  as  they  are  in  fact 
incompatible  things,  scholars  resist  the  attempt.^  With 
this  conception  also  the  word  of  James,  "a  new  name  for 
an  old  thing,"  gets  a  very  satisfactory  meaning;  namely, 
that  man  has  always  been  inclined  to  judge  philosophical 
theories  from  their  ethical  results.  Pragmatism  is  simply  the 
philosophy  which  tries  to  establish  this  conception  of  things 
on  a  systematic  basis,  to  justify  this  natural  inclination. 

It  is  of  this  ethical  pragmatism — the  only  one  which 
has  a  clear  and  distinct  meaning — that  Rousseau  is  a  fore- 
runner.* 

THE  SCIENTIFIC  PHASE  OF  ROUSSEAU'S  THOUGHT. 

It  might  be  interesting,  and  I  think  very  relevant,  to 
point  out  first  a  remarkable  symmetry  in  the  philosophical 
evolution  of  Rousseau  and  James,  the  latter  being  by  far 

*Sc«  the  writer's  Anti-pragmatisme  (Paris,  1909)  pp.  26-37. 

•The  words  f^ra^matisme,  or  pragmatique,  are  of  course  not  to  be  found 
in  Roiitscau.  In  Nouvcllc  Hdlotse  (II.  5)  he  speaks  of  Julie's  father  saying:  '  Sa 
flU  tut  est  mains  ch^re  que  la  Pragmatique"  \  but  here  the  political  act  of 
CharlrB  VI  of  Austria  is  meant  by  which  (1713)  this  emperor  assured  the 
throne  to  Maric-Thercse  as  his  successor. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  3 

the  chief  representative  of  pragmatism;  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  without  him  the  movement  would  have  been 
still-born. 

We  observe  that  both  thinkers  came  to  pragmatic  ideas 
after  a  period  of  enthusiasm  for  pure  science.  James  be- 
gan by  studying  natural  sciences;  he  took  an  M.  D.,  and  at 
first  taught  anatomy  at  Harvard  University.  Then  he 
went  over  to  psychology  and  wrote  his  most  famous  work, 
and  finally  he  produced  his  pragmatistic  papers  and  books. 
These  facts  can  be  interpreted  thus :  When  he  began  to  look 
at  things  for  himself  and  reflect  on  them,  James  was  at 
first  interested  in  the  universe  in  a  purely  objective  way;  he 
looked  at  it  as  a  product  which  he  liked  to  study  in  a  per- 
fectly impersonal  manner.  Then,  secondly,  he  saw  that 
the  world  was  still  more  interesting  when  viewed  from  a 
human  standpoint,  from  the  psychological  standpoint ;  that 
man,  moreover,  cannot  view  it  from  any  other  point  of  view, 
absolute  truth  being  outside  of  our  means  of  perception. 
Then  he  wrote  his  great  work,  Psychology.  Finally  he  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  man  has  an  interest  in  the  world  not 
only  from  a  human,  in  the  sense  of  a  psychological,  stand- 
point, but  from  an  ethical,  or  may  be  religious  standpoint, 
as  well;  that  man  not  only  studies  life,  he  lives  it,  he  has  a 
practical  interest  in  it.    Then  he  wrote  Pragmatism. 

Rousseau's  philosophical  evolution  describes  exactly  the 
same  curve.  Everybody  remembers  in  the  Confessions 
what  he  tells  of  his  reading  in  mathematics,  physics,  chem- 
istry and  so  forth,  when  living  with  Madame  de  Warens;* 
and  especially  the  delightful  scene  where  he  is  accused  of 
necromancy  by  passers-by  who  see  him  in  a  garden  at  mid- 
night studying  astronomy  in  grotesque  attire,  moving  a 
telescope  backward  and  forward  with  mysterious  gestures, 
and  stretched  out  before,  or  rather  under,  a  map  of  the  sky 

'See  especially  Book  VI.  Cf.  also  Ritter:  Famille  et  jeunesse  <U  J.  J. 
Rousseau,  pp.  219  ff. 


4  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

illuminated  by  the  weird  light  of  a  candle  standing  in  a 
flower  pot  ;*  or  the  account  of  how  he  nearly  blinded  him- 
self for  life  by  careless  handling  of  chemical  substances  in 
an  unfortunate  attempt  to  manufacture  ''encre  de  synipa- 
thi€"f  or  again  when  he  himself  tells  so  charmingly  (al- 
ways in  the  Confessions)  that  his  famous  polype  au  coeur 
which  disappeared  so  miraculously  before  he  came  near 
the  doctor,  when  a  pretty  woman  appeared  on  the  scene,® 
was  nothing  but  the  result  of  overstudy  of  books  on  anat- 
omy, physiology  and  medicine ;  for,  like  the  famous  Dutch 
physician  he  could  not  read  the  description  of  a  disease 
without  at  once  feeling  perfectly  satisfied  that  he  was  suf- 
fering from  it.  Finally  I  need  not  insist  on  Rousseau's 
fondness  for  botany  which  first  developed  at  that  period 
also.'^ 

Rousseau  did  not  teach  sciences,  as  did  Prof  essor  James, 
but  he  made  use  of  his  knowledge  in  mathematics  as 
a  member  of  the  staff  entrusted  by  Charles  Emanuel 
III  with  the  survey  of  the  kingdom  of  Savoy.  He  also 
wrote  in  Chambery  in  1738,  and  published  in  the  Mercure 
de  France  of  July,  a  "Memoire  siir  la  sphericite  de  la  terre." 
Better  still,  Rousseau  wrote  in  Paris,  probably  about  1747, 
a  treatise  on  chemistry  in  four  parts,  Les  institutions  chy- 
miqucs,  the  manuscripts  of  which  have  been  kept  in  the 
city  library  at  Geneva  since  1904. 

THE  PHYSIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL  PHASE. 

The  second  period  of  Rousseau's  philosophical  develop- 
ment corresponds  to  that  in  which  James  wrote  his  Psy- 
chology.   Now  we  must  remember  that  in  his  book  James 

*CEuvres,  VIII,  171-2. 

*CEuvres,  VIII,  155.  That  the  rumor  spread  of  Rousseau's  experiments, 
•ee  Hitter,  Famille  et  jeunesse  de  J.  J.  Rousseau  (1896),  p.  221. 

*(Euvres,  VIII,  pp.  177-8:  ".  ..Voila  Mme.  de  Larnage  qui  m'entreprend ; 
et  adieu  le  pauvre  Jean-Jacques,  ou  plutot  adieu  ]a  fievre,  les  vapeurs,  le  po- 
lype  " 

'  (Euvres,  VIII,  p.  128. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  5 

has  given  up  the  traditional  treatment  of  the  three  facul- 
ties, sentiment,  intelligence,  will.  He  offers  a  sort  of  nat- 
ural history  of  our  mental  faculties  in  connection  with,  or 
even  taking  as  a  basis,  our  sensations,  hence  the  name  of 
"experimental"  or  ''physiological"  psychology  given  to  the 
modern  science  we  all  know. 

This  conception  of  things  goes  naturally  as  far  back 
as  the  1 8th  century,  to  Locke's  £^^-03;  on  Human  Under- 
standing. Indeed  we  can  almost  say  that  the  works  of  our 
great  thinkers  of  the  19th  century,  like  John  Stuart  Mill 
in  his  Logic,  Taine  in  his  Intelligence,  Wundt,  Spencer, 
James  in  their  Psychologies,  are  but  new  editions,  broader 
in  some  places,  more  consistent  in  others,  of  Locke's  epoch- 
making  book.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  nobody  ever  went  so 
far  in  the  direction  of  sensualism  and  materialism  as  does 
James  in  his  well-known  theory  of  emotions,  according  to 
which  we  do  not  weep  because  we  are  sad,  but  we  are  sad 
because  we  weep,  the  physical  phenomenon  not  being  the 
effect  of  the  psychical  one,  but  rather  the  reverse. 

Rousseau,  thanks  in  great  part  no  doubt  to  his  unsys- 
tematic education,  was  endowed  with  a  very  unprejudiced 
mind,  and  he  did  not  hesitate  at  all  to  adopt  views  that 
were  held  at  the  time  only  by  a  few  progressive  men; 
Locke's  ideas  on  this  particular  subject  soon  became  his 
own,^  and  we  can  easily  see  how  they  came  to  him.  He  tells 
us  in  the  Confessions  that  in  the  years  after  his  return  from 
Venice  to  Paris  (1744)  he  had  become  a  great  friend  of 
Condillac,  then  writing  his  famous  books.®  He  calls  him 
once  "un  tres  grand  metaphysicien."^^  Although  Rousseau 
never  went  as  far  as  Condillac  does  in  his  Traite  des  sensa- 
tions (1754),  in  stating  that  the  only  origin  of  all  our 

'  He  had  already  studied  Locke  at  the  Charmettes.  See  CEuvres,  VIII,  p. 
169. 

•  CEuvres,  VIII,  p.  246.  Rousseau  places  this  in  the  years  1747-49,  but  this 
must  be  a  mistake  smce  the  book  of  Condillac  mentioned  by  Rousseau  was 
published  in  1746.    See  Appendix  I,  "Rousseau  and  Condillac." 

^"CEuvres,  XII,  p.  304;  cf.  II,  75. 


6  ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

ideas  is  sensation  alone,  he  shared  entirely  the  views  of  the 
earlier  Essai  sur  rorigine  dcs  connaissances  humaines 
(1746),  that  there  are  no  innate  ideas  and  that  our  ideas, 
due  to  reflection,  would  never  have  developed  without  sen- 
sation— the  Locke  point  of  view.  Rousseau  remained  true 
to  those  beliefs  in  the  time  of  his  mature  philosophy;  in 
Emilc^^  for  instance,  and  in  the  much  later  Dialogues^^  we 
find  them  again  only  slightly  transformed.  It  would  be 
quite  interesting  to  point  out  the  influence  of  those  physio- 
logical-psychological views  on  Rousseau  in  several  special 
works,  especially  in  the  Essai  sur  I'origine  des  langues, 
which  was  written  under  the  inspiration  of  Condillac's 
ideas ;"  and  in  a  book  which  has  not  been  printed,  the  man- 
uscript of  it  being  probably  lost  for  ever,  La  morale  sensi- 
tive ou  le  materialisme  du  sage. 

Students  of  Rousseau,  generally,  ignore  this  work  en- 
tirely, and  it  is  pardonable  since  the  book  is  lost.  But  a  great 
loss  indeed  it  is,  for  surely  no  work  could  have  given  us 
a  better  insight  into  Rousseau's  real  mind,  precisely  be- 
cause it  belongs  to  a  period  of  transition,  when  he  is  not 
yet  completely  the  Rousseau  of  the  Noiivelle  Helo'ise  or  of 
Emilc.  We  would  have  seen  there  how  he  became  the 
later  Rousseau,  while  now  we  have  to  guess  more  or  less. 
Fortunately  the  little  bit  we  know  about  the  book  we  owe 
to  Rousseau  himself,  and  so  the  information  may  be  relied 
upon." 

What  was  this  book  ?  Rousseau  tells  us  that  among  the 
works  he  intended  to  write — and  which  later  were  given 
up — there  was  one  which  he  hoped  would  prove  truly  use- 

"  Ste  Books  I.  IT,  III,  (Euvres,  II,  e.  g.,  pp.  32-33,  102,  188  etc. 
"a-uirri,  IX.  196. 
**  Cf.  Qluvres,  I,  p.  93. 

"Sec  Appendix  IT,  "Rousseau  and  Madame  de  Genlis." — There  is,  more- 
over, an  interesting  problem  of  erudition  in  connection  with  the  Morale  sensi- 
ttt'e;  but  the  discussion  of  it  belongs  rather  in  a  review  for  the  history  of 
literature.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  further  information  about  the  book  is  not  ob- 
tainal)le.  at  least  now,  and  that  all  that  is  reliable  goes  back  to  what  Rousseau 
says  himself  in  the  Confessions. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  7 

ful  to  men.  "We  have  noticed  that  in  the  course  of  their 
lives  most  men  are  unlike  themselves  and  seem  to  be 
changed  into  beings  entirely  different.  It  was  not  indeed 
to  prove  so  well  known  a  thing  that  I  proposed  to  write  a 
book ;  I  had  a  more  important  and  newer  purpose.  It  was 
to  find  out  about  the  causes  of  those  variations,  and  to 
study  those  which  are  dependent  on  us  in  order  to  show 
how  we  could  direct  them  ourselves  in  order  to  render 
us  better  and  exert  more  control  over  our  actions. ...  In 
probing  myself,  and  in  examining  others  as  to  the  causes 
of  those  different  dispositions  I  found  that  they  depended 
in  great  part  on  the  preceding  impressions  of  exterior  ob- 
jects, and  that,  modified  constantly  by  our  senses  and  by 
our  organs,  we  were  feeling,  without  knowing  it,  in  our 
ideas,  in  our  sentiments,  in  our  actions  even,  the  effect  of 
those  modifications.  The  striking  and  numerous  observa- 
tions which  I  had  gathered  were  beyond  discussion;  and 
by  their  physical  principles,  they  seemed  to  me  fit  to  pro- 
vide us  with  a  physical  regime  which,  adapted  to  circum- 
stances, could  place  our  souls  in  the  conditions  most  favor- 
able to  virtue.  . .  .Climates,  seasons,  sounds,  colors,  dark- 
ness, light,  elements [?],  food,  noise,  silence,  motion,  rest, 
everything  acts  on  our  machine,  and  on  our  soul  conse- 
quently. ..  .However,  I  worked  but  little  on  that  book, 
the  title  of  which  was  La  morale  sensitive  ou  le  materia- 
lisme  dtt  sage.  Distractions  which  I  shall  soon  explain 
prevented  me  from  devoting  much  time  to  it,  and  the 
reader  will  know  also  what  has  become  of  my  first  draft...." 
This  passage  is  from  the  ninth  book  of  the  Confessions 
(pp.  292-3).  In  book  twelve  (pp.  46-7)  he  tells  of  all  sorts 
of  papers  that  were  stolen  from  the  things  he  had  left  in 
care  of  Madame  de  Luxembourg  at  the  time  of  his  hasty 
flight  to  Switzerland,  when  the  Emile  had  been  condemned. 
Among  the  stolen  papers  was  the  manuscript  of  the  Morale 
sensitive,  and  Rousseau  suspects  D'Alembert,  who,  as  a 


8  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

friend  of  Madame  de  Luxembourg  may  have  succeeded 
in  seeing  those  manuscripts,  perhaps  by  bribing  some  ser- 
vant." At  that  time  Rousseau  considered  D'Alembert  as 
one  of  his  worst  enemies,  and  comments  thus:  "I  suppose 
that,  deceived  by  the  title  of  La  morale  sensitive,  he  thought 
he  had  discovered  the  outhne  of  a  real  treatise  of  material- 
ism, which  he  would  have  used  against  me  as  one  might 
well  imagine."^* 

One  may  well  ask  why  Rousseau  did  not  take  up  his 
work  again.  I  think  we  can  guess  the  reason,  and  the  very 
note  we  have  quoted  about  D'Alembert  could  suggest  a 
clue.  Such  a  book  was  not  only  difficult  to  write,  it  might 
prove  positively  dangerous.  For  in  conveying  upon  people 
the  materialistic  idea  that  the  dispositions  of  our  "soul" 
depended  ultimately  so  much  upon  physical  sensations,  since 
comparatively  very  few,  if  any,  of  the  former  are  actually 
within  our  control,  people  might  take  that  as  an  excuse  for 
not  reacting  against  the  lower  impulses  of  the  flesh.  Thus 
the  book  could  be  interpreted  as  an  excuse  for  our  weak- 
nesses, instead  of  a  remedy  against  them,  and  so  would 
provide  arms  to  the  enemy,  while  throwing  away  our  own. 
Madame  de  Genlis  would  certainly  not  have  been  the  only 
one  to  gather  from  Rousseau's  notes  the  impression  which 
Rousseau  himself  thought  might  be  D'Alembert's.  She 
reflects :  "I  never  thought  that  virtue  depended  upon  good 
digestion  or  on  the  temperature  of  the  air,  or  that  certain 
drinks  could  cure  bad  inclinations,  and  that  it  was  possible 
to  absorb  morality,  like  tea,  by  infusion."" 

"In  a  note  (Vol.  XII,  p.  47)  Rousseau  explains  that  D'Alembert  had 
plagiarized  many  of  his  articles  before  they  were  printed  in  the  Encyclopedie 
(for  the  EUmens  de  tnusique). 

"One  feels  inclined  to  reject  such  ungenerous  suspicions.  Still,  after  the 
book  of  Mrs.  Macdonald  which  shows  how  really  shamefully  Rousseau  was 
treated  by  some  of  his  contemporaries,  there  is  a  possibility  of  truth.  So,  if 
we  should  ever  get  some  parts  of  the  Morale  sensitive  back,  it  might  be  in 
looking  into  D'Alembert.  The  search  may  be  worth  while — the  writer  not 
having  at  hand  the  books  necessary  for  such  an  inquiry  is  obliged  to  confine 
himself  to  these  indications. 

"  Priface  d  Alphonsine,  p.  iii. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  9 

The  insurmountable  difficulty  is,  of  course,  that  there 
is  absolutely  no  criterion  to  decide  where  to  stop  in  ad- 
mitting that  physical  conditions  are  responsible  for  our 
morality.  You  cannot  at  one  moment  step  in  and  say: 
"Now  I  will  be  virtuous,"  without  throwing  over  the  whole 
theory;  for  this  sudden  disposition  depends  precisely  upon 
foregoing  dispositions,  and  those  form  an  endless  chain. 
Suppose  a  meal  is  so  made  up  as  not  to  develop  my  lower 
passions;  either  I  am  responsible  for  the  meal  or  another 
is.  If  another  is,  then  it  is  clear  that  my  temper  is  not  in 
my  own  hands.  If  I  am,  then  I  must  have  been  predisposed 
well  in  order  to  order  the  virtuous  meal ;  so  from  antece- 
dent to  antecedent,  we  are  bound  to  come  to  admit  that  we 
are  no  longer  responsible  for  anything.     The  same  holds 

of  climate,  wind,  rest,  noise,  etc What  can  I  do?  There 

is  no  middle  term:  we  are  or  we  are  not  in  control.  You 
may  leave  the  subject  alone  altogether, — which  is  very  wise 
perhaps, — but  if  you  take  it  up,  then  you  must  be  logical. 

Rousseau  chose  to  say  that  the  dispositions  of  our  soul 
depend  upon  material  conditions ;  the  result  is  that  he  will 
tell  us  very  interesting  facts  probably,  but  surely  none  very 
favorable  to  moralization.  And  the  time  came  when  he 
saw  it  himself,  and  therefore  he  dropped  the  book.  I  ven- 
ture to  say  that  if  he  had  written  it,  he  would  have  torn  it 
to  pieces  afterwards.^®  The  time  when  he  was  thinking 
of  writing  it  indicates  a  period  of  unconscious  hesitation 
between  the  scientific  or  psychological  point  of  view,  and 
the  ethical  or  pragmatic.  He  was  then  just  where  James 
stood  when  he  produced  his  Psychology,  the  latter's  po- 
sition is  defined  by  Marillier  after  a  long  discussion 
of  the  book  in  the  following  terms:  "The  teleological 
character  of  the  system  is  at  first  striking,  and  one  must 

"  The  book  Rousseau  had  in  mind  has  been  written ;  but  a  century  later. 
Those  who  are  interested  to  see  what  a  consistent  treatise  of  the  sort  may  be- 
come ought  to  read:  Yves  Guyot,  La  morale,  Paris,  1883  (in  the  collection 
Bibliotheque  materialiste). 


lO  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

penetrate  beyond  the  literal  sense  to  notice  that  very  often 
it  is  a  selection  of  a  mechanical  character  much  rather 
than  of  an  intentional  choice  that  is  meant.  This  W.  James 
says  clearly  nowhere;  perhaps  not  because  he  is  not  decided 
yet  which  one  of  the  two  conceptions  he  will  make  his  own, 
but  because  he  constantly  goes  from  the  one  to  the  other 
without  admitting  it  plainly/'  {Revue  philosophique,  Feb., 
1893,  p.  182,) 

THE    PRAGMATIC    PHASE. 

James  finally  decided  for  a  teleological  system,  or  what 
is  now  often  called — a  new  name  for  an  old  thing — prag- 
matism. I  have  shown  elsewhere,  in  quoting  texts,  how 
pragmatic  utterances  had  meant  at  first  for  James  simply 
a  set  of  rules  for  practical  life,  independent  and  really  out- 
side of  philosophy,  and  how  gradually  the  idea  came  to  him 
of  introducing  those  merely  practical  pieces  of  advice  into 
philosophy  itself,  and  trying  to  subordinate  intellectual  and 
scientific  principles  to  practical  principles.^^  The  result  is 
that  his  philosophy  now,  pragmatic  philosophy,  is  described 
by  James  himself  in  such  sentences  as:  ''The  'true,'  to  put 
it  very  briefly,  is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our 
thinking,  just  as  the  'right'  is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way 
of  our  behaving."  {Pragmatism^  p.  222)  f^  ©r  "On  prag- 
matic principles  we  cannot  reject  any  hypothesis  if  con- 
sequences useful  to  life  flow  from  it. . .  .They  [universal 
conceptions]  have.  . .  .no  meaning  and  no  reality  if  they 
have  no  use.  But  if  they  have  any  use,  they  have  that 
amount  of  meaning."  {Ibid.,  p.  273.)  (Of  course  we 
must  understand  that  in  the  second  part  of  the  quotation, 
James  means  also  "useful  to  life,"  as  nothing  indicates 
any  change  to  "useful"  in  a  merely  scientific  sense).    Or  let 

"  A.  Schinz,  Anti-pragmatistne,  Paris,  1909,  pp.  52-54. 

"  What  James  says  regarding  this  passage  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy 
of  December,  1908,  does  not  affect  the  case  very  much. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  II 

US  recall  the  pragmatic  ''question" :  "Grant  an  idea  or  be- 
lief to  be  true,  what  concrete  difference  will  its  being  true 
make  in  any  one's  actual  life?"  (Ibid.,  p,  200.)  This  is 
plainly  making  philosophy  a  servant  to  ethics.  Philosophia 
ancilla  theologiae  was  the  definition  of  scholasticism ;  Phi- 
losophia ancilla  ethicae  is  the  definition  of  pragmatism. 

Now  let  us  see  Rousseau  reaching  the  same  goal. 

Exactly  parallel  to  James's  phrase:  "On  pragmatic 
principles,  we  cannot  reject  any  hypothesis  if  consequences 
useful  to  life  flow  from  it,"  is  Rousseau's  declaration  at 
the  end  of  his  career,  when  he  summarizes  his  philosophical 
and  literary  creed,  and  writes,  speaking  of  himself  (Sec- 
ond Dialogue^^)  :  "I  have  never  seen  him  listen  calmly  to 
any  theory  that  he  believed  harmful  to  the  public  weal."  (Je 
ne  I'ai  jamais  vu  ecouter  de  sang  froid  toute  doctrine  qii'il 
crut  nuisible  au  bien  public). 

As  was  to  be  the  case  with  William  James  one  century 
and  a  half  later,  Rousseau  had  really  never  committed  him- 
self to  a  mechanical  conception  of  life ;  he  had  only,  for  a 
while,  used  such  language  and  studied  problems  in  such  a 
fashion  that  reader^'  could  hesitate  as  to  his  real  opinion 
on  those  questions.  So  when  he  had  once  decided  to  pub- 
licly take  a  stand  against  such  mechanical  theories  of  life, 
he  felt  like  dispelling  any  uncertainty  in  the  public,  and 
missed  few  occasions  to  come  out  openly  against  the  mate- 
rialism of  his  epoch.  He  did  so  repeatedly  in  his  best-known 
works.  Let  us  take  only  one  example,  which  is  not  so  well 
known. 

In  1758  he  wanted  to  write  a  complete  and  systematic 
refutation  of  Helvetius's  book  De  V esprit.  He  finally  gave 
it  up,  because  the  work  in  question  was  condemned  by  the 
censor  shortly  after  its  publication  and  the  sale  of  it  was 
prohibited.*^    But  we  have  the  marginal  notes  put  by  Rous- 

^  CEuvres,  IX,  p.  194. 
"^  CEuvres,  III,  122. 


12  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

seau  to  his  edition  of  Helvetius's  book,  and  they  give  us  a 
very  clear  idea  of  what  Rousseau  wanted  to  prove.  They  are 
pubHshed  in  the  CEuvres  completes,  XII,  pp.  296-304.  Hel- 
vetius  maintained  that  man  is  merely  passive  in  his  judg- 
ments, in  his  sentiments  and  actions.  This  irritated  Rous- 
seau and  he  refers  finally  to  a  refutation  in  the  Profession 
de  foi  dn  Vicaire  Savoyard}^ 

To  Helvetius  who  thinks  that  two  (passive)  faculties, 
sensation  and  memory,  are  sufficient  to  account  for  our 
whole  mental  activity,  and  that  comparer  and  juger  are 
merely  other  forms  of  sensation,  Rousseau  objects  that, 
already  in  comparison  due  to  memory  there  is  something 
more  than  mere  passive  sensation  of  difference;  and  as  to 
the  distinction  between  sensation  and  judgment,  he  ex- 
presses it  thus:^^  "To  perceive  objects  is  sensation;  to  per- 
ceive relations  is  judgment"  (Apercevoir  les  objets  c'est 
scntir,  apercevoir  les  rapports  c'est  juger). 

The  whole  discussion  is  summed  up  and  concluded  in 
the  Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard  as  follows :  "Thus 
I  am  not  merely  a  sentient  and  passive  being,  but  an  active 
and  intelligent  being,  and  no  matter  what  philosophers  say, 
I  dare  pretend  to  the  honor  of  thinking.  I  know  only  that 
truth  is  in  the  things  and  not  in  my  mind  which  judges  them 
(que  la  verite  est  dans  les  choses  et  non  pas  dans  mon  esprit 
qui  les  juge)  and  that  the  less  I  put  of  my  own  in  my  judg- 
ments about  them,  the  surer   I  am  to  come  near  the  truth : 

■  There  is  here  again  a  small  problem  of  erudition.  We  must  believe  that 
the  notes  on  De  I'esprit  are  made  on  the  first  edition,  as  Rousseau  expressly 
states  it  in  a  letter  (cf.  CEuvres,  Vol.  IX,  p.  418)  ;  but,  as  the  first  edition  was 
of  1758,  and  the  Vicaire  Savoyard  is  of  1761  or  1762,  how  could  Rousseau  refer 
in  1758  to  a  work  published  three  or  four  years  later  (p.  304)  ?  The  whole 
problem  of  the  relations  of  the  Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard  and  the 
Refutation  du  livre  de  I'esprit  will  be  examined  by  the  writer  elsewhere;  let 
it  suffice  here  to  say  that  a  solution  is  not  impossible  if  one  weighs  carefully 
every  word  of  Rousseau  in  XII,  304.  No  doubt  Rousseau  was  at  the  time 
(1758)  already  busy  with  the  Profession  de  foi]  possibly  a  good  part  of  it 
was  more  or  less  ready,  and  thus  he  could  speak  of  it  as  of  a  work  in  existence 
although  not  yet  before  the  eyes  of  the  public. 

"  CEuvres,  XII,  p.  300. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  1 3 

thus  my  rule,  to  listen  to  sentiment  more  than  to  reason, 
is  supported  by  reason  itself." 

Why  is  Rousseau  so  much  concerned  with  those  the- 
ories ? — The  last  passage  quoted  tells  it  plainly :  if  human 
judgment  is  merely  passive,  the  same  will  be  true  of  our 
emotions,  of  our  wills  which  depend  on  our  perceptions  and 
judgments  of  things ;  if  that  were  true,  it  would  do  away 
with  moral  freedom,  and  this  would  be  fatal  from  an 
ethical  point  of  view.  That  this  is  the  attitude  of  Rousseau 
is  shown  in  the  second  part  of  his  refutation  of  Helvetius, 
one  of  his  last  remarks  being:  "In  the  first  place  upright- 
ness is  indispensable,  and  not  intellect  (I' esprit) ;  and  in  the 
second  place  it  depends  upon  us  to  be  honest  people,  and 
not  to  be  gefis  d' esprit"  (XII,  304) ;  it  is  shown  abundantly 
further  in  all  his  best  known  works. 

Rousseau  is  determined  to  get  a  philosophy  of  an  eth- 
ical nature,  i.  e.,  a  philosophy  which  must  be  good  morally 
for  humanity,  even  at  the  expense  of  truth  if  need  be;  h6 
will  refuse  to  consider  any  other  as  he  himself  told  us." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  nature,  life,  and  therefore  philosophy, 
are  neither  moral  nor  immoral,  they  are  indifferent,  or  as 
we  say  now  a-moral ;  but  I  repeat  it  once  more,  this  is  just 
the  distinctive  character  of  pragmatism  that  it  would  force 
nature  and  life,  and  therefore  philosophy,  to  be  moral,  or, 
as  some  say,  teleological, — the  latter  term  meaning  again 
"morally"  teleological,  it  goes  without  saying.  Of  course, 
if  nature,  and  therefore  objective  truth,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  morality  on  the  other  hand  agreed  with  each  other, 
philosophy  would  never  have  been  anything  else  but  prag- 
matic, it  would  be  so  naturally.  But  as  they  do  not  agree, 
a  special  philosophy,  different  from  natural  philosophy,  was 
to  be  founded  in  order  to  carry  through  pragmatic,  i.  e., 
non-natural  philosophical  principles.     Pragmatic  philos- 

"  CEuvres,  IX,  194,  quoted  above,  and  cf.  with  James's  Will  to  Believe,  p. 
126. 


14  ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

ophy  is  therefore,  cannot  be  anything  but,  unobjective  phi- 
losophy, superposed  over  objective  philosophy. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  philosophy  to  be  acceptable  must 
look  objective  and  natural,  and  so  of  course  pragmatic 
philosophy  will  have  to  claim  that  it  is  natural  philosophy. 
And  as  it  h  not,  it  will  have  to  try  to  make  us  believe  that  it 
is:  therefore,  to  create  a  confusion  between  a  natural  or 
objective  philosophy,  and  a  non-natural  philosophy  is  the 
very  aim  pragmatic  philosophers  will  have  to  pursue.  If 
they  do  not  do  it,  if  they  do  not  conceal  the  fact  that  natural 
philosophy  and  pragmatic  philosophy  do  not  naturally 
agree,  their  cause  is  lost. 

Thus  the  success  of  pragmatic  philosophers,  like  Rous- 
seau and  James,  depends  upon  their  cleverness  to  confuse 
things ;  and  indeed  they  have  made  it  hard  for  their  oppo- 
nents to  disentangle  the  fallacies  of  pragmatism.  Philos- 
ophers ought  never  to  cut  Gordian  knots ;  let  me  try  to  untie 
smoothly  Rousseau's  knot.  The  whole  matter  is  contained 
in  the  last  passage  quoted. 

To  reduce  philosophy  to  pragmatic  or  moral  philosophy, 
two  things  are  necessary : 

1.  to  prove  that  we  are  not  mere  automata,  that  we 
can  be  really  moral,  i.  e.,  active. 

2.  to  prove  that  our  natural  way  of  thinking  is  prag- 
matic or  moral,  not  intellectual ;  that  therefore  moral 
thinking  is  not  merely  a  special  application  of  pure 
thinking,  of  rational  thinking,  but  is  thinking  itself. 

Thus,  the  two  adversaries  to  be  fought  will  be  sensual- 
ism and  rationalism. 

First,  Rousseau  forms  an  alliance  with  rationalism  to 
defeat  sensualism,  thus  establishing  that  human  beings 
actually  think ;  that  the  way  in  which  they  think  does  not 
depend  exclusively  on  the  data  of  the  senses. 

Secondly,  this  once  established,  Rousseau  suddenly 
turns  against  rationalism,  and  says  that  thinking  is  bad. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  1 5 

He  means,  of  course,  mere  thinking,  thinking  which  is  not 
''morally"  colored.  As  morality  is  the  goal,  any  thinking 
that  is  not  "moral"  is  bad,  therefore  the  less  one  thinks, 
i.  e.,  thinks  merely  rationally,  the  better. 

Let  us  now  read  over  the  little  paragraph  quoted  and 
analyze  it  and  see  whether  I  have  betrayed  Rousseau's 
thought. 

First  he  says :  "I  dare  pretend  to  the  honor  of  thinking." 

But  he  adds  immediately :  "/  know  only  that  truth  is  in 
the  things  and  not  in  my  mind  which  judges  them,  and 
that  the  less  I  put  of  my  own  in  my  judgments  about  them, 
the  surer  I  am  to  come  near  the  truth :  thus  my  rule  to  listen 
to  sentiment  rather  than  to  reason  is  supported  by  reason 
itself." 

The  "only"  between  parts  i  and  2  is  a  very  innocent 
looking  word;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  the  most  re- 
markable opposition  between  the  two  statements  connected 
by  it. 

The  first  says :  I  think ;  I  am  not  only  passive  but  active 
in  my  judgments ;  I  must  think,  otherwise  I  am  not  free  and 
there  is  no  morality  possible. 

The  second  says:  The  more  I  think,  the  further  away 
I  go  from  truth;  I  must  not  think,  otherwise  I  get  away 
^  from  sound  moral  thinking. 

Thus:  first,  I  must  think  (to  be  free)  ;  second,  I  must 
not  think  (to  be  right). 

There  seems  to  be  another  contradiction  in  Rousseau's 
attitude  towards  sensualism  and  rationalism.  Regarding 
the  first  he  said :  Let  us  not  admit  that  we  are  passive  in  our 
judgments;  and  regarding  the  second:  Let  us  rather  be 
passive  in  our  judgments.  But  never  mind  the  paradox. 
What  he  is  aiming  at  all  the  time,  is  plainly  indicated  by  the 
last  sentence  of  the  little  paragraph  under  consideration 
where  he  opposes  sentiment  to  reason.  He  means  that  we 
ought  not  to  be  aflfected  by  intellectual  or  rational  judg- 


1 6  ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

ments;  we  must  not  think  intellectually.  In  other  words 
he  admits  the  existence  of  other  judgments  besides  inteU 
lectual  judgments. 

What  are  those  other  judgments,  suddenly  and  sur- 
reptitiously thrown  into  the  discussion? — Well,  the  senti- 
mental judgments,  which  Rousseau  seems  to  avoid  to  name, 
are  the  moral  or  pragmatic  judgments.  But  why  this  fear 
of  speaking  plainly,  of  expressing  openly  the  principles 
which  are  at  the  bottom  of  his  whole  philosophy  and  of 
momentous  works  like  Emile  and  all  the  others?  Simply 
because  Rousseau  felt  clearly  that  this  move,  the  admit- 
ting of  different  sorts  of  judgments,  though  clever  for 
his  purpose,  could  not  stand  the  test  of  critical  examination. 
To  judge,  which  implies  to  think,  cannot  not  be  intellectual, 
and  so  either  to  think  and  judge  morally  is  one  and  the 
same  thing  as  to  think  and  judge  intellectually,  or  it  is  not ; 
and  then  to  judge  morally  is  to  judge  non-intellectually  or 
irrationally  (or  a-rationally,  that  makes  no  difference.) 
Now,  as  Rousseau  plainly  suggests  two  kinds  of  judgments, 
(a)  sentimental  and  {h)  rational  or  intellectual,  there  is  no 
way  out  of  it,  the  sentimental  must  not  be  rational.  There 
would  be  no  use  distinguishing  them  if  they  were  alike. 

We  come  now  to  the  next  question.  As  Rousseau  puts 
those  irrational  judgments  at  the  basis  of  his  philosophy, 
refers  to  them  all  the  time,  they  must  of  course  correspond 
to  something  definite.  What  is  it?  What  is  practical 
reason  as  opposed  to  pure  reason  (for  this  is  the  oppo- 
sition which  Rousseau  establishes  and  which  Kant  named 
so  conveniently)  ?  Back  of  this  famous  term,  practical 
reason,  lies  the  whole  secret  of  the  pragmatic  fallacy^ 

When  you  judge  or  think,  you  always  judge  intelleo* 
tually  or  rationally,  there  is  no  escape  from  that;  but  it 
is  possible  when  judging  intellectually  to  judge  either  ob- 
jectively or  subjectively;  and  now  we  see  at  once  how 
"practical  reason"  can  still  remain  "reason."     You  have 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  I7 

pure  reason  and  applied  reason,  pure  philosophy  and  ap- 
plied philosophy,  as  you  have  pure  science  and  applied 
science.  As  a  mathematician  gives  up  pure  mathematics 
for  astronomy,  or  a  chemist  gives  up  pure  chemistry  for 
confection  of  food,  or  a  physicist  gives  up  pure  physics  to 
manufacture  telephones,  so  one  can  give  up  pure  philos- 
ophy for  applied  philosophy,  the  most  common  form  of 
which  is  ethics.  It  is  still  intellectual,  but  what  was  the 
end  before,  to  study  and  to  judge  man,  nature,  life  for  the 
sake  of  pure  science,  for  the  sake  of  promoting  objective 
truth,  has  become  a  means,  i.  e.,  one  applies  judgment  or 
thought  about  men,  nature,  life  to  the  promoting  of  happi- 
ness, of  social  order,  of  morality — no  matter  how  you  call 
it.  And  this  applied  judgment,  this  intellectual  judgment 
in  favor  of  a  special  end,  an  ethical  end,  is  the  sentimental 
judgment  of  Rousseau,  or,  as  he  calls  it,  simply  sentiment, 
meaning  of  course  moral  sentiment,  or  moral  sense. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Rousseau  and  later  pragmatism 
have  done  nothing  except  to  say,  and  try  to  make  us  be- 
lieve, that  this  applied  moral  philosophy  is  really  philos- 
ophy itself,  and  that  whatever  is  not  moral  philosophy  (or 
does  not  lead  to  it  directly  or  indirectly ;  religion  e.  g.  in  a 
pragmatic  sense  is  "moral"  too)  is  not  true  philosophy. 
But  this  is  as  if  an  astronomer  said  that  of  mathematics 
only  so  much  is  true  as  can  be  applied  to  astronomy ;  or  if 
a  food  manufacturer  claimed  that  only  that  much  of  chem- 
istry is  true  which  applies  to  ''Force"  or  "Quaker  Oats" ; 
or  if  a  capitalist  owning  a  street-car  line  maintained  that 
physics  is  true  only  in  so  far  as  it  can  move  his  cars  along. 

Keeping  in  mind  then  that  "sentiment"  or  sentimental 
judgment  of  Rousseau  is  nothing  else  than  a  special  appli- 
cation of  philosophy  or  pure  reason  to  ethics,  let  us  read  in 
its  more  explicit  form  the  little  sentence  ending  our  para- 
graph; only  two  adjectives  have  to  be  supplied  to  betray 
the  fallacy  in  logic :  "My  rule,  to  allow  myself  to  be  guided 


1 8  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

by  sentiment  rather  than  by  [pure]  reason  is  confirmed  by 
[practical]  reason  itself";  or,  as  we  have  seen  that  the 
second  "reason,"  practical  reason,  is  the  same  as  "senti- 
ment," we  will  have:  ''my  rule to  be  guided  by  senti- 
ment rather  than  by  reason,  is  confirmed  by  sentiment  (it- 
self)"— which  of  course  is  just  the  opposite  of  the  conclu- 
sion Rousseau  wishes  to  reach ;  and  moreover,  a  very  trans- 
parent petitio  prmcipii;  as  if  a  father  were  going  to  prove 
his  authority  over  his  children  by  saying:  this  authority 
is  proven  because  I  say  so.  The  word  ''itself"  is  absolutely 
illegitimate,  and  suggests  to  the  reader  a  confusion  which 
he  could  not  possibly  have  committed  if  clear  terms  had 
been  used,  if  "reason"  was  used  consistently,  and  not  at 
first  as  pure  reason,  and  then  as  practical  reason. 

The  fallacies  just  exposed  are  more  easily  recognized  in 
Dewey  than  in  James  and  Rousseau.  Dewey  naively  at- 
tempted an  elaborate  and  painful  identification  of  purely 
philosophical  principles  and  pragmatic  principles  on  log- 
ical grounds;  I  have  shown  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy 
(of  Nov.  1 6,  1908)  why  it  was  a  priori  impossible  that  he 
should  succeed,  and  how  in  insisting  upon  logic  in  prag- 
matism, he  was  carried  to  the  antipodes  of  pragmatism  in 
spite  of  himself.  James  and  Rousseau  wisely  did  not  insist 
on  that  part  of  the  matter;  Rousseau,  as  has  just  been 
seen,  managed  to  get  the  whole  thing  in  an  innocent  look- 
ing little  bit  of  a  paragraph  where  probably  not  one  of  a 
thousand  readers  will  notice  it — a  real  trick  of  legerdemain 
(done,  I  need  not  say,  with  a  very  generous  and  moral 
purpose  in  view,  a  pieux  mensonge  as  they  say  in  Rous- 
seau's country).  James  is  as  wise  as  Rousseau;  he  kept 
silent.  Only  once  have  I  noticed  that  he  faced  the  difficulty, 
and  then  the  honesty  of  the  man  betrayed  the  attempts  of 
the  philosopher :  for  he  implicitly  admits  that  there  is  really 
no  logical,  no  rational  background  to  that  aspect  of  prag- 
matism.   This  important  passage  is  found  in  Pragmatism, 

1 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  I9 

when  James  feels  cornered  by  an  objection  to  pragmatic 
views,  which  he  cannot  help  mentioning,  namely :  what  has 
the  teleological  element  to  do  with  truth?  "The  essence 
of  a  sane  mind,  you  may  say,  is  to  take  shorter  views,  and 
to  feel  no  concern  about  such  chimeras  as  the  latter  end 
of  the  world.  Well,  I  can  only  say  that  if  you  say  this 
you  do  injustice  to  human  nature}^  Religious  melancholy 
is  not  disposed  of  by  a  simple  flourish  of  the  word  insanity. 
The  absolute  things,  the  last  things,  the  overlapping  things, 
are  the  truly  philosophic  concerns.  ..."  (p.  io8).  Nobody 
says  that  you  must  ignore  those  "absolute.  .  .last.  .  .over- 
lapping things,"  or  even  that  they  are  not  more  important  to 
humanity  than  merely  objective  philosophy.  But  the  true 
philosopher  considers  that  one  ought  not  call  objective 
philosophy  that  which  is  only  the  result  of  our  anxiety  to 
make  the  reasoning  faculty  serve  moral  purposes. 

Another  passage  of  James  may  be  quoted  here  as  proof 
of  how  much  the  same  preoccupations  are  at  the  bottom 
of  both  philosophies.  I  need  only  recall  the  fact  that  what 
Rousseau  called  sensualism  is  now  called  materialism,  and 
what  Rousseau  called  rationalism  is  now  called  agnosti- 
cism. Keeping  this  in  mind  read  James :  "Just  as,  within 
the  limits  of  theism,  some  kinds  [of  theisms]  are  surviving 
others  by  reason  of  their  greater  practical  rationality  [ !], 
so  theism  itself,  by  reason  of  its  practical  rationality  is  cer- 
tain to  survive  all  lower  creeds.  Materialism  and  agnosti- 
cism, even  were  they  true,  could  never  gain  universal  and 
popular  acceptance,  for  they  both  alike  give  a  solution  of 
things  which  is  irrational  to  the  practical  third  of  our 
nature  ["sentimental"  third  of  Rousseau],  and  in  which 
we  can  never  volitionally  feel  at  home."  {The  Will  to 
Believe,  p.  126.) 

For  both  Rousseau  and  James  the  whole  problem  of 

"The  italics  are  mine. 


20  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

philosophy  consists  in  this :  identify  truthfulness*'  and  use- 
fulness. You  can  say  of  a  truth  "either  that  *it  is  useful  be- 
cause it  is  true/  or  that  *it  is  true  because  it  is  useful'  " ;  and 
the  "usefulness"  meant  there  is  pragmatic  or  ethical  "truth- 
fulness," not  merely  "objective"  or  "scientific" :  "On  prag- 
matic principles  we  can  not  reject  any  hypothesis  if  con- 
sequences useful  to  life  flow  from  it."  {Pragm.,  p.  273 ;  cf . 
222,  233  and  234,  and  the  whole  of  lectures  VII  and  VIII.) 

This  ethical  meaning  is  the  meaning  of  the  pragmatic 
"question":  "Grant  an  idea  or  a  belief  to  be  true,  what 
concrete  difference  will  its  being  true  make  in  anyone's 
actual  life?" — or  there  is  none. 

And  notice  that  we  find  this  famous  "pragmatic  ques- 
tion" formulated  in  remarkably  similar  terms  by  Rousseau. 
It  is  expressed  or  understood  everywhere  in  his  writings; 
but  probably  nowhere  so  plainly  stated  as  in  the  third  book 
of  Emile. 

In  the  program  laid  out  by  him  for  the  education 
of  the  boy,  Rousseau  proposes  for  the  two  first  periods, 
from  one  to  two,  and  from  two  to  twelve  years  of  age,  a 
merely  physical  and  animal  development;  the  body  and 
mind  of  the  child  must  be  let  free,  he  must  get  strong  and 
ready  for  work.  Only  when  he  is  twelve  years  of  age,  shall 
Emile  begin  to  apply  his  acquired  strength  and  faculties  to 
some  definite  purposes.  The  time  has  come  to  teach  him. 
What  shall  one  teach  him?  There  are  three,  or  rather 
four  sorts  of  things,  which  man  can  learn :  some  are  false, 
some  useless,  some  proper  only  to  develop  our  vanity. 
There  are  a  few,  however,  which  are  worthy  of  a  wise 
man:  "The  question  is  not  to  know  what  is,  but  only  to 
know  what  is  useful."  (//  ne  s'agit  pas  de  savoir  ce  qui 
est,  mais  seulement  ce  qui  est  utile.)  Thus  ignoring  all 
other  preoccupations,  the  sacred  word  from  now  on  will 

*  I  do  not  see  that  it  makes  much  diflference  to  say  truth  or  truthfulness ; 
still  as  James  insists  in  a  special  article  {Journal  of  Philosophy,  March  26, 
1908)  on  that  distinction  I  gladly  insert  "truthfulness." 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  21 

be:  What  is  it  good  for?  (A  quoi  ccla  est-il  hon?)  This 
is  the  lesson  you  ought  to  teach  the  child,  namely,  to  desire  to 
know  nothing  except  the  useful.  Let  me  quote  the  few  lines 
with  which  Rousseau  sums  up  his  whole  book  of  Entile :  "It 
is  enough  that  the  child  should  know  the  'what  for'  (I'd  quoi 
hon)  of  everything  he  does,  and  the  'why'  of  everything  he 
believes.  Once  more :  my  purpose  is  not  to  give  him  science, 
hut  to  teach  him  how  to  get  it  in  case  of  need,  to  make  him 
appreciate  it  for  exactly  what  it  is  worth,  and  to  make  him 
love  truth  above  allJ'^^  (P.  179.) — How  clear  it  is  here 
that  "truth"  means  "practical  truth,"  "cash-value,"  as 
James  says,  in  opposition  to  "science" ! 

All  this,  I  say,  is  good  pragmatism. 

When  it  comes  to  special  application  of  pragmatic  prin- 
ciples the  comparison  holds  of  course.  But  as  Roussea:u 
has  worked  out  the  applications  more  than  the  principles 
and  James  has  done  the  reverse,  it  will  suffice  to  refer  the 
reader  to  the  second  half  of  the  Nouvelle  Heloise  where 
applications  follow  upon  applications  under  Rousseau's 
pen.  See  particularly  Part  V,  Letter  3.  One  instance, 
however,  may  be  allowed  here :  the  views  of  Rousseau  and 
James  about  religion.  I  have  treated  this  point  at  length 
regarding  James  in  my  hook  A  titi- pragmatism e,  p.  143  flF.  I 
recall  only  one  passage  of  Pragmatism:  ''If  theological 
ideas  prove  to  have  a  value  for  concrete  life,  they  will  he 
true,  for  pragmatism,  in  the  sense  of  heing  true  for  so 
much.'**^  Now  here  are  two  short  sentences  (from  among 
hundreds)  showing  how  Rousseau  applied  the  pragmatic 
principles  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  principles  which, 
when  applied,  look  much  less  sublime  than  when  vested 
in  the  eloquent  sentences  of  the  Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire 

*  The  italics  are  mine. 

•James  underlines. — It  is  true  that  he  adds:  "For  how  much  they  are  true, 
will  depend  entirely  on  their  relations  to  the  other  truths  that  also  have  to  be 
acknowledged,"  but  it  is  evident  that  this  contradicts  the  first  sentence  flatljr. 
If  the  ideas  are  true  anyway,  what  is  the  use  of  pragmatism ;  if  pragmatic 
ideas  have  the  first  right  to  be  called  truth,  why  bother  about  other  criterions  ? 


22  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

Savoyard ;  even  here  the  grand  style  of  Rousseau  has  daz- 
zled most  of  his  readers.  A  few  years  had  elapsed  since 
Saint  Preux  and  Julie  had  yielded  to  their  love ;  now  Julie 
is  married  to  Wolmar,  but  Saint  Preux  lives  under  the 
same  roof  as  preceptor  of  their  children.  Wolmar  goes 
away  and  the  two  former  lovers  remain  alone:  "Our 
hearts,"  writes  Saint  Preux,  **had  loved  each  other;  they 
had  not  forgotten ;  and  everything  now  seemed  to  unite  in 
making  us  sin  again."  Julie  was  determined,  however,  to 
conquer,  and  ''she  could  not  imagine  a  more  reliable  pre- 
caution than  to  impose  upon  herself  constantly  a  witness 
whom  she  would  have  to  respect,  to  call,  as  a  third  one 
among  us,  the  upright  and  redoubtable  Judge  who  sees  se- 
cret actions  and  reads  our  hearts.  She  surrounded  herself 
with  His  supreme  majesty;  I  saw  God  constantly  between 
her  and  me.  What  guilty  desire  could  have  attempted  to 
ignore  such  protection  ?"^*^ 

And  on  the  same  page  again,  discussing  the  case  of 
Wolmar  who  was  good  without  religion,  Rousseau  puts  in 
Saint  Preux's  mouth  the  following  words :  "Milord,  we  will 
never  be  able  to  convert  that  man;  he  is  too  cold,  and  he 
is  good ;  the  question  is  not  to  touch  him  [with  arguments] ; 
he  lacks  the  interior  proof,  the  proof  of  sentiment,  and  this 
is  the  only  one  which  renders  the  others  irresistible."  This 
means:  Wolmar  needs  no  religion,  being  good  without  it; 
therefore  we  have  no  way  of  converting  him.  And  here 
remember  James's  words  in  the  Will  to  Believe,  p.  30: 
"The  whole  defense  of  religion  hinges  upon  action.  If 
the  action  required  or  inspired  by  the  religious  hypothesis 
is  in  no  way  different  from  that  dictated  by  the  naturalistic 
hypothesis,  then  religious  faith  is  a  pure  superfluity,  better 
pruned  away,  and  controversy  about  its  legitimacy  is  a 
piece  of  idle  trifling,  unworthy  of  serious  minds. "^^   Rous- 

••  CEuvres,  IV,  p.  416. 

"It  is  true  that  Wolmar  is  not  actually  presented  to  us  as  sharing  the 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  23 

seau  said:  "And  if  the  Great  Being  did  not  exist.  . .  .it 
would  still  be  well  that  man  should  think  of  him  [s'en 
occupdt]  constantly,  so  as  to  remain  better  in  control  of 
himself,  to  be  stronger,  happier  and  wiser."  (CEuvres, 
IV,  p.  248.) 

To  sum  up  my  whole  demonstration  of  the  parallelism 
of  Rousseau's  and  James's  thought,  I  offer  the  two  follow- 
ing passages  for  comparison.  In  them,  for  every  one  who 
has  in  the  least  a  critical  sense,  these  two  thinkers  give 
themselves  away  (if  I  may  so  speak)  in  their  attempts  at 
pragmatizing  philosophy.  These  two  passages  allow  us 
to  put  our  finger  right  on  the  spot  where  the  system  leaks, 
or,  still  better,  goes  off  on  a  tangent. 

James  writes  in  Pragmatism,  pp.  76-77: 

"If  there  be  any  life  that  it  is  really  better  we  should 
lead,  and  if  there  should  be  any  idea,  which,  if  believed  in, 
would  help  us  to  lead  that  life,  then  it  would  be  really 
better  for  us  to  believe  in  that  idea,  unless,  indeed,  belief 
in  it  incidentally  clashed  with  other  great  vital  benefits. 
[Now  listen:]  'What  would  be  better  for  us  to  believe'! 
This  sounds  very  like  a  definition  of  truth.  It  comes  very 
near  saying  'what  we  ought  to  believe':  and  in  that  defi- 
nition none  of  you  would  find  any  oddity.  Ought  we  ever 
not  to  believe  what  it  is  better  for  tis  to  believe  ?  And  can 
we  then  keep  the  notion  of  what  is  better  for  us,  and  what 
is  true  for  us  permanently  apart  ?"  That  playing  with  the 
logical  and  the  sentimental  meaning  of  ought,  I  call  the 
superlative  of  cleverness.^^ 

Now  to  Rousseau.  It  is  a  passage  from  the  answer  to 
the  archbishop  of  Paris  (CEuvres,  III,  pp.  92-93),  who  had 
written  his  "Mandement"  against  Emile,  speaking  espe- 
cially of  the  Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard. 

'Tt  appears  to  me  credible  that,  after  these  long  periods 

"naturalistic  hypothesis,"  but  that  is  of  no  importance  here;  any  thing  that  is 
not  the  "religious  hypothesis"  may  be  understood  as  well. 

"The  same  has  been  done  by  Schiller.    See  Anti-pragmatisme,  pp.  23-24. 


24  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

lost  in  puerile  controversies,  men  of  sense  will  some  day 
seek  for  a  means  of  conciliation.  The  first  thing  they  will 
propose  will  be  to  put  out  of  the  assembly  all  theologians 
[you  might  read  just  as  well  metaphysicians  or  philos- 
ophers]. This  good  work  done,  they  will  say  to  the  peo- 
ples :  'So  long  as  you  do  not  agree  upon  any  common  prin- 
ciple, it  is  impossible  for  you  to  understand  each  other ;  and 
it  is  an  argument  that  has  never  convinced  any  one,  to 
say  I  am  right  and  you  are  wrong.  You  speak  of  what  is 
agreeable  to  God,  but  that  is  precisely  what  is  in  question ! 
If  we  knew  which  creed  was  most  agreeable  to  Him,  there 
would  be  no  dispute  between  us.  But  you  also  speak  of 
what  is  'useful'  to  men — that  is  a  different  matter.  Men 
can  decide  that.  Let  us  take  this  utility  for  our  rule,  and 
then  let  us  establish  the  doctrine  which  is  nearest  to  it. 
We  may  by  this  means  hope  to  approach  as  near  to  the 
truth  as  is  possible  to  men ;  for  we  may  assume^^  that  what 
is  most  useful  to  the  creatures  of  His  hand,  is  most  agree- 
able to  the  Creator." 

Exactly  the  same  fundamentally:  the  useful,  in  the 
sense  of  the  morally  good,  must  be  the  principle  of  belief, 
philosophic  or  religious,  the  only  difference  in  expression  be- 
ing due  to  the  circumstances  under  which  the  passages  were 
written.  Rousseau  proves  a  trifle  more  theological  because 
he  answers  de  Beaumont  who  attacked  his  pragmatism  on 
religious  grounds,  and  he  wants  to  show  that  he  is  far 
from  indifferent  to  religious  problems ;  James,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  facing  philosophers  and  argues  with  the  aim  of 
turning  logicians  into  moralists  or  pragmatists. 

Of  the  two,  James  is  altogether  more  philosophical. 
Rousseau  thinks  that  he  can  oppose  a  systematic  and 
rational  philosophy  to  the  objective  philosophers  on  the 
one  hand,  and  to  the  dogmatic  Christians  on  the  other, 
namely  that  in  the  world  everything  is  rationally  and  mor- 

"The  italics  are  mine. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  2$ 

ally  harmonious  (Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard) ; 
while  James  is  more  modest  and  frankly  acknowledges  that 
pragmatism  requires  the  giving  up  of  the  ideal  of  unity 
of  thought.  He  plunges  into  pluralism  because  reality  re- 
fuses to  be  synthetized  in  his  philosophy:  "The  world  is 
One  just  as  far  as  we  experience  it  to  be  concatenated,  One 
by  as  many  definite  conjunctions  as  appear.  But  then  also 
not  One  by  just  as  many  definite  conjunctions  as  we  find.  .  . 
It  is  neither  a  universe  pure  and  simple,  nor  a  multiverse 
pure  and  simple."  {Pragm.,  p.  148).  James  advocates 
meliorism  because  he  cannot  be  an  optimist:  "It  is  clear 
that  pragmatism  must  incline  towards  meliorism Me- 
liorism treats  salvation  as  neither  necessary  nor  impos- 
sible. . ."  (p.  286).  This  modesty  about  the  shortcomings 
of  his  own  philosophy  is  extremely  praiseworthy  on  James's 
part;  only  as  it  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  pragmatism 
does  not  stand  the  scientific  test  of  unity  of  thought,  it  is 
from  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  simply  suicidal. 

THREE   CHARACTERISTIC   APPLICATIONS    OF   PRAGMATIC 

PRINCIPLES. 

Our  task  is  really  over  here.  Still  it  is  interesting  to 
remark  how  closely  the  two  philosophers  compare,  when 
one  examines  some  applications  of  the  pragmatic  principles 
which  the  two  men  have  deemed  important  to  discuss. 

Three  examples  may  be  selected: 

I.  For  both  men  the  ultimate  purpose  of  pragmatic 
principles  is  to  fit  people  for  practical  life  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, and  thus  increase  their  general  happiness.  Now  the 
danger  is  that  if  you  preach  happiness  outright  people  are 
likely  to  indulge  unwisely  in  pleasures  and  thus,  either  to 
burn  the  candle  at  both  ends,  or  to  get  blase  to  pleasure; 
in  both  cases  it  means  depriving  themselves  ultimately  of 
good  things  just  out  of  sheer  ignorance  or  heedlessness. 
There  was  at  the  time  of  Rousseau,  and  there  exists  un- 


26  ROUSSEAU,,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

doubtedly  to-day,  a  tendency  among  us  to  overwork  our- 
selves, so  to  speak,  in  making  merry,  while  for  purely 
Epicurean  reasons  we  really  ought  to  refrain  more.  Thus, 
both  Rousseau  and  James  insist  repeatedly  in  their  writ- 
ings on  a  sort  of  asceticism  which  men  must  impose  on 
themselves,  not  at  all  to  deprive  themselves,  but  on  the 
contrary  to  get  more  enjoyment  out  of  life  in  the  long  run, 
or  more  power  of  resistance  against  suffering.  From  James 
I  quote  the  passage  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  126-7,  which 
he  has  not  unfrequently  developed  in  later  works,  recently 
in  a  pedagogical  publication.  It  is  found  at  the  end  of  the 
chapter  on  "Habit" :  "As  a  final  practical  maxim,  relative 
to  these  habits  of  the  will,  we  may  then  offer  some  thing 
like  this :  Keep  the  faculty  of  effort  alive  in  you  by  a  little 
gratuitous  exercise  every  day.  That  is,  be  systematically 
ascetic  or  heroic  in  little,  unnecessary  points;  do  every  day 
or  two  something  for  no  other  reason  than  that  you  would 
rather  not  do  it,  so  that  when  the  hour  of  dire  need  draws 
nigh,  it  may  find  you  not  unnerved  and  untrained  to  stand 
the  test.  Asceticism  of  this  sort  is  like  the  insurance  which 
a  man  pays  on  his  house  and  goods.  The  tax  does  him  no 
good  at  the  time  and  possibly  may  never  bring  him  a  return. 
But  if  the  fire  does  come,  his  having  paid  it  will  be  his  sal- 
vation from  ruin.  So  with  the  man  who  has  daily  inured 
himself  to  habits  of  concentrated  attention,  energetic  voli- 
tion and  self-denial  in  unnecessary  things,  he  will  stand  like 
a  tower  when  everything  rocks  around  him  and  when  his 
softer  fellow-mortals  are  winnowed  like  chaff  in  the  blast." 
James  here  takes  life  in  its  severe  aspect;  let  us  se- 
lect in  Rousseau  a  few  passages  where  the  Epicurean  note 
is  more  pronounced.  The  author  writes  of  the  incompar- 
able Julie :  "The  means  she  uses  to  give  value  to  the  small- 
est things  is  to  refuse  to  take  them  twenty  times,  in  order 
to  enjoy  them  once."  One  of  the  ends  she  wishes  to  reach 
thus,  is  "to  remain  her  own  mistress,  to  force  passions  to 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  27 

obey,  and  to  subordinate  all  her  desires  to  the  rule.  It  is 
a  new  way  of  being  happy ;  for  one  enjoys  without  uneasi- 
ness only  what  one  can  lose  without  difficulty ;  and  if  true 
happiness  belongs  to  the  sage,  it  is  because,  of  all  men,  he 
is  the  one  from  whom  fortune  can  rob  least"  (CEuvres  IV, 
pp.  378-9).  Or  again:  "The  privations  which  she  imposes 
upon  herself  by  this  tempering  voluptuousness  (cette  vo- 
lupte  temper  ante)  are  both  new  means  of  pleasure,  and 
new  ways  of  economizing.  For  instance,  she  loves  black 
coffee:  at  her  mother's  house  she  took  some  every  day; 
she  has  given  up  the  habit  in  order  to  get  more  taste  for  it. 
She  has  decided  to  have  some  only  when  guests  are  about, 
and  in  the  salon  d'Apollon,  in  order  to  add  this  little  enjoy- 
ment to  the  others"  (p.  386).  At  times  this  goes  so  far 
as  to  lack  the  sense  of  the  beautiful:  ''When  I  tell  her  of 
the  things  they  invent  all  the  time  in  Paris  to  render  car- 
riages more  comfortable  to  ride  in,  she  approves  of  that 
well  enough;  but,  when  I  tell  her  how  far  they  have  gone 
in  improving  the  varnishes  of  the  carriages,  she  follows  me 
no  more  and  will  always  ask,  whether  those  beautiful  var- 
nishes will  render  the  carriages  more  convenient"  (p. 
371).^*  Shall  we  say  that  the  heroic  "Roman  virtues"  so 
emphatically  praised  by  Rousseau  lose  something  of  their 
lustre  when  brought  back  to  that  pragmatic  standpoint? 
2.  In  another  point,  we  may  call  it  the  metaphysical 
meaning  of  life,  James  and  Rousseau  show  rather  striking 
similarity  of  thought.  Both  are  anxious  to  secure  for  men 
the  happiest  and  at  the  same  time  the  healthiest  way  of 
living;  and  not  only  do  they  see  that  the  practice  of  'vir- 
tue' is  by  no  means  always  accompanied  by  happiness,  but 
also  that  people  get  at  times  impatient  to  wait  until  after 
death  to  settle  their  bills  of  rewards.  So  as  our  philos- 
ophers address  everybody,  and  especially  the  masses,  i.  e., 
mostly  more  or  less  childlike  people,  they  must  find  some 

•*  See  also  pp.  380,  384,  397  ff.  etc. 


28  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

sort  of  encouragement  for  them.  They  will  then  pat  a 
man  on  the  back  and  tell  him  not  to  be  sulky  at  the  unpleas- 
antness of  life,  as  we  do  our  boys  when  they  are  reluctant 
to  go  to  the  dentist  and  we  tell  them :  Now,  you  will  be  a 
good  boy,  you  will  not  cry,  you  will  be  a  real  courageous 
boy.  That  is  the  meaning  of  James's  theory  of  risk:  man 
has  the  honor,  the  great  honor  of  conquering  evil.  This  is 
greatly  preferable  to  just  plain  happiness;  nobody  would 
want  that,  would  he?  "Those  Puritans  who  answered 
'yes'  to  the  question:  Are  you  willing  to  be  damned  for 
God's  glory?  were  in  this  objective[?]  and  magnanimous 
condition  of  mind"  (Pragm.,  p.  297). 

Rousseau  ends  his  Profession  de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoy- 
ard with  a  few  statements  that  remind  us  curiously  of  the 
last  pages  of  Pragmatism:  "Why  is  my  soul  dependent 
upon  my  senses  and  chained  to  this  body  which  makes  a 
servant  of  it  and  is  a  hindrance  to  it?  I  know  nothing 
about  it;  did  I  enter  into  the  secrets  of  God?  But  I  can 
without  impropriety  ofifer  modest  suggestions.  I  say  to 
myself :  Tf  man's  mind  had  remained  free  and  pure,  what 
merit  would  there  be  to  love  and  follow  the  order  estab- 
lished in  the  universe  and  to  disturb  which  would  give 
him  no  advantage?'  He  would  he  happy,  no  doubt;  but 
his  happiness  would  not  be  of  the  most  sublime  kind  which 
is  the  glory  of  virtue  and  a  good  conscience :  he  would  be 
only  like  angels;  and  no  doubt  one  day  the  virtuous  man 
will  count  more  than  they  do.  United  to  a  mortal  body 
by  bonds  no  less  powerful  than  they  are  incomprehensible, 
the  care  for  the  conservation  of  this  body  incites  the  soul 
to  refer  everything  to  itself,  and  gives  it  an  interest  which 
is  contrary  to  the  general  order,  which  it  can  nevertheless 
see  and  love.  Then  it  is  that  the  right  exercise  of  his 
free-will  becomes  both  merit  and  recompense,  and  that 
man  prepares  for  himself  an  unalterable  happiness  in  fight- 
ing against  his  terrestrial  passions  and  keeping  true  to  his 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  29 

first  volition. "^^  In  a  more  solemn  tone  than  James  in  his 
last  lecture,  this  expresses  very  much  the  same  thing:  Man 
has  a  beautiful  chance  to  be  great,  to  conquer  evil;  he 
certainly  would  not  forfeit  the  honor,  the  occasion  of  being 
a  hero,  of  outdoing  divine  beings  who  simply  cannot  help 
being  good.  All  this  is  simply  taking  man  by  his  vanity 
so  that  he  may  not  see  the  pettiness  of  his  God ;  the  ultimate 
purpose  of  the  order  of  things  not  only  is  never  made  clear, 
but  it  is  positively  a  stumbling  block  in  a  system  which 
claims  the  rational  God  of  Protestantism.^^ 

3.  The  last  rather  striking  similarity  in  the  details  of 
the  two  pragmatisms  of  Rousseau  and  James,  which  will 
be  mentioned  here  is  this :  Both  want  men  to  be  persuaded 
that  there  is  a  spiritual  power  above  us,  and  they  warn 
against  the  false  claims  of  vain  science.  As  indeed  all 
superior  beings  in  all  times,  they  both  have  a  deep  sense 
for  the  mysteries  that  surround  life,  and  will  surround  it 
even  if  we  know  a  thousand  times  as  much  as  we  do  now. 
In  other  words,  both  have  a  decided  predisposition  to  mys- 
ticism. From  James  we  have  words  like  these  appearing 
in  his  Will  to  Beliez'e :  "The  negative,  the  alogical  is  never 
wholly  banished.  Something — call  it  chance,  freedom, 
spontaneity,  the  devil,  what  you  will — is  still  wrong  and 
other  and  outside  and  unincluded,  from  your  point  of 
view,  even  though  you  be  the  greatest  of  philosophers"  (p. 
viii).  James  has  become  a  member  of  the  Society  for 
Psychical  Research.  In  Rousseau  one  will  not  find  the 
theory  expressed  so  plainly,  because,  as  has  been  said 
above,  he  is  not  as  philosophical  a  mind  as  James,  not  feel- 
ing the  shortcomings  of  his  system  and  thinking  he  can 
keep  philosophical  unity  together  with  pragmatism.  In  a 
way,  of  course,  his  religion  of  "sentiment"  is  after  all  mys- 

"  CEuvres,  II,  p.  264. 

"^  Which  at  bottom  is  also  James's.  I  have  shown  in  my  book  how  the 
God  of  Catholicism  is  more  satisfying  than  the  Protestant  one.  See  Anti- 
pragmatisnte,  pp.  185-190. 


30  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

ticism.  But  further  we  have  a  few  very  interesting  facts 
showing  that  Rousseau  was  inclined  to  believe  in  certain 
kinds  of  seconde  vne  and  in  the  realization  of  dreams.  He 
experienced  one  illustration  of  seconde  vue  himself  and 
told  Bernardin  de  Saint  Pierre  about  it.  The  latter  relates 
the  conversation  as  follows :  "He  firmly  believed  that  Di- 
vinity had  laws  of  action  unknown  to  men.  We  were  speak- 
ing of  presentiment,  striking  dreams,  and  I  quoted  some  to 
him.  Then  he  told  me:  Once  when  I  was  in  the  age  of 
innocence  and  purity,  I  was  alone  in  the  country,  and  I 
allowed  my  thoughts  to  wander  freely  until  I  finally  com- 
pletely lost  consciousness  of  the  landscape  around  me ;  and 
I  saw  a  castle,  avenues,  hedges,  a  society  of  people  whom 
I  had  never  seen,  but  all  so  clearly,  so  distinctly  alive  that, 
filled  with  astonishment,  I  regained  consciousness  so  struck 
with  the  picture  that  it  remained  profoundly  impressed  in 
my  memory  with  all  its  details.  Many  years  after  I  found 
myself  in  a  castle  with  the  same  hedges,  personages,  fig- 
ures, actions;  and  the  whole  so  absolutely  alike  that  I  ut- 
tered a  cry  of  surprise."  (Pp.  102-103.)  Now,  if  we 
open  the  Nouvelle  Helo'ise  once  more,  which  was  to  the 
end  the  favorite  book  of  Rousseau,  we  find  that  he  believed 
in  dreams.  In  Part  V,  letter  9,  St.  Preux  (Rousseau)  sees 
Julie  who  comes  herself  to  announce  that  she  is  going  to 
die  soon.  Claire,  hearing  the  dream  (letter  10)  is  all  up- 
set ;  and  a  few  pages  further  we  hear  of  the  accident  that 
caused  the  young  woman's  death.  Furthermore  we  have 
a  passage  where  St.  Preux,  in  spite  of  the  theories  which 
were  expressed  at  the  very  same  epoch  in  Emile,  actually 
believes  in  the  interference  of  God  in  the  affairs  of  this 
world  to  grant  a  prayer.  In  Book  V,  letter  6,  Wolmar  tells 
his  wife  that  her  prayers  for  his  conversion  would  have 
been  heard  long  ago  if  there  had  been  a  God,  and  in  a 
sort  of  ecstasy  Julie  answers:  "They  will  be  heard.  . .  .1 
know  not  the  time  and  the  occasion.    Would  that  I  might 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  3 1 

procure  this  with  my  life!  My  last  day  would  then  be 
the  most  useful."  And  here  again  the  presentiment  on 
the  one  hand  is  realized,  and  the  prayer  is  granted. 


How  shall  we  account  for  two  philosophers  so  much 
alike  in  their  departure  from  objective  truth  and  separated 
from  each  other  by  a  century  and  a  half? 

The  explanation  is  not  far  to  seek.  They  both  were 
men  before  being  philosophers;  they  both  cared  for  the 
welfare  of  humanity  to  such  an  extent  that  they  could  not 
remain  impartial  in  their  attitude  towards  plain  truth  as 
the  latter  seemed  to  point  to  another  direction  than  the  one 
they  wanted,  and  which  would  always  be  in  full  agreement 
with  human  ethics.  And  each  lived  at  a  time  when  society 
was  threatened  by  scientific  theories  which  were  dangerous 
to  the  equilibrium  of  sound  moral  life  in  the  community. 
The  1 8th  century  was  facing  materialism;  our  epoch  is  fa- 
cing agnosticism.  Rousseau  and  James  both  felt  that  scien- 
tific truth  was  not  good  for  all,  that  it  could  easily  be  mis- 
interpreted by  the  unprepared  minds  of  the  masses,  and 
they  proposed  pragmatism,  i.  e.,  to  subordinate  philosophy 
to  ethics,  to  identify  truthfulness  and  usefulness.  That  the 
intention  was  generous,  no  thoughtful  person  can  deny. 
Whether  the  method  is  commendable  is  another  question; 
but  it  is  not  my  intention  to  discuss  this  here.  I  would 
rather  end  by  asking  another  question. 

Are  Rousseau  and  James  themselves  satisfied  with  their 
theories  ? 

As  far  as  James  is  concerned  I  have  tried  to  answer  in 
my  book  in  the  chapter  called:  "Is  James  a  Pragmatist?" 
Moreover  I  have  discussed  above  his  pluralism  and  me- 
liorism] nobody  wilfully  admits  that  his  philosophy  lacks 
a  principle  of  unity ;  James  was  compelled  to  do  it  in  order 
to  remain  a  pragmatist. 


\ 


32  ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

What  about  Rousseau?  I  doubt  whether  he  was  ever 
entirely  convinced  by  his  own  philosophy. 

As  early  as  the  time  when  he  wrote  his  first  "Discours" 
he  realized  the  difficulty  of  his  position  (see  the  last  pages 
of  it)  :  if  science  and  art  are  really  bad  for  civilization,  bad 
morally  for  nations,  then  one  ought  to  do  away  with  them. 
Rousseau  obstinately  refuses  to  draw  this  conclusion ;  and 
after  several  attempts,  to  reconcile  things,  he  gives  this  as 
his  final  theory:  **When  people  are  corrupted  [as  we  are] 
it  is  better  that  they  should  be  educated  than  not  (savants 
qii'ignorants)  ;  when  they  are  good  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
science  will  corrupt  them"  (Letter  of  July  15,  1768).  Now 
this  cannot  be  understood  otherwise  than :  Prevent  people 
from  getting  corrupt  by  not  allowing  them  to  get  objective 
truth,  science  and  art;  but  when  they  are  corrupt,  it  is 
better  that  they  should  corrupt  themselves  more ....  Of 
course  Rousseau  could  not  mean  that.^^ 

Further,  I  should  like  to  call  attention  to  Rousseau^s 
inconsistency,  when  he  maintains  that  botany,  which  is  a 
science  also,  ought  not  to  be  studied  for  merely  practical 
purposes.  At  the  end  of  his  life  especially  he  strongly 
objects  to  those  who  feel  like  asking  the  pragmatic  ques- 
tion :  A  quoi  cela  est-il  bonf,  who  study  plants  ''only  with 
the  purpose  of  getting  drugs  and  remedies."  This  "dis- 
gusting prejudice"  is  especially  strong  in  France,  he  thinks : 
a  bel  esprit  of  Paris,  seeing  in  London  a  public  garden  full 
of  trees  and  rare  plants,  was  "barbarous"  enough  to  cry 
out  "by  way  of  praise  these  words:  'Here  is  a  beautiful 
garden  for  an  apothecary !'  "  As  to  himself  "all  this  phar- 
macy did  not  sully  his  enjoyment  of  the  country."^® 

Finally  I  refer  the  reader  to  the  third  Reverie,  where  in 
later  years  Rousseau  discusses  his  own  philosophy.  Among 
other  things  he  says :  "I  confess  that  I  did  not  solve  to  my 

"  See  Appendix  III,  "An  Unknown  Phase  of  Rousseau's  Thought." 
"CEuvres,  IX,  pp.  375-6. 


ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  33 

satisfaction  all  the  difficulties  which  embarrassed  me,  and 
which  philosophers  constantly  opposed  to  us.  But  deter- 
mined to  reach  at  least  some  decision  in  matters  on  which 
human  intelligence  has  so  little  hold,  and  finding  every- 
where impenetrable  mysteries  and  unsolvable  objections, 
I  adopted  in  every  question  the  'sentiment'  which  appeared 
to  me  best  established  by  direct  data,  the  most  credible  in 
itself,  without  stopping  at  objections  which  I  could  not 
remove,  but  which  were  met  by  other  objections,  not  less 
strong,  in  the  opposite  system."  And  again:  "Since  then, 
I  have  quietly  remained  true  to  the  principles  which  I  had 
adopted  after  so  long  a  meditation.  I  adopted  them  as  the 
immutable  rule  of  my  behavior  and  of  my  belief,  without 
troubling  any  more  about  the  objections  which  I  had  not 
been  able  to  solve,  or  had  not  been  in  a  position  to  foresee, 
and  which  from  time  to  time  came  up  in  my  mind."^^ 

One  sees  that  there  might  be  room  for  a  chapter  "Was 
Rousseau  a  Pragmatist?"  corresponding  to  the  one  on 
James  discussing  the  same  question. 

•'  (Euvres,  IV,  pp.  342-343- 


APPENDIX    I. 

Rousseau  and  Condillac. 

(See  note  9,  page  5.) 

The  passage  in  Confessions  VII  {(Euvres  VIII,  p.  246) 
reads  thus: 

*'I  had  made  friends  with  the  Abbe  de  Condillac  who 
at  that  time  did  not  yet  count  in  the  realm  of  letters  any- 
more than  I  did,  but  who  was  even  then  well  prepared  to 
become  what  he  now  is.  I  was  perhaps  the  first  to  guess 
who  the  man  was,  and  to  estimate  him  at  his  real  value. 
He  seemed  to  enjoy  my  company  also,  and  while  I  kept  to 
my  room  on  the  rue  Jean-Saint-Denis  near  the  opera  house, 
where  I  composed  my  "Hesiod"  act  [of  the  opera  Les 
Muses  Galantes  and  which  was  substituted  for  an  original 
'Tasso'  act,  at  the  request  of  the  Duke  of  Richelieu],  he 
came  to  dine  with  me  from  time  to  time,  en  tete-a-tete.  He 
was  then  working  on  his  Essai  sur  Vorigine  des  connais- 
sances  humaines " 

In  this  first  book,  i.  e.,  at  the  time  when  Rousseau 
knew  him  so  intimately,  Condillac,  as  is  well  known,  proves 
to  be  simply  a  faithful  follower  of  Locke.  Like  the  latter 
he  recognized  two  distinct  sources  for  our  knowledge; 
"sensation**  was  not  yet  considered  sufficient  but  needed 
the  help  of  a  special  faculty  of  "reflection"  to  produce 
"perception."  It  was  only  later,  in  the  Traite  des  sensa- 
tions (1754)  that  Condillac  maintained  that  Locke  had 
not  gone  far  enough  and  that  sensation  alone  was  sufficient 
to  account  for  all  our  ideas,  emotions  and  volitions,  even 


ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  35 

the  most  complex.  As  to  Rousseau  his  scientific  views  of 
the  theory  of  knowledge  never  developed  beyond  the  Locke 
point  of  view ;  but  to  that  he  remained  true  and  never  went 
back  to  the  Cartesian  theories  of  innate  ideas  although 
in  ethics  he  left  the  sensualists  altogether.  This  can  be 
seen  in  all  his  mature  writings.  Let  us  take  a  few  sentences 
only  from  Emile:  "In  the  beginning  of  life,"  he  says  for 
instance,  "the  child  pays  attention  only  to  what  actually 
strikes  his  senses,  sensations  being  the  first  material  of 
knowledge.  If  they  are  offered  to  him  in  the  proper  order, 
his  memory  will  be  prepared  to  provide  him  with  the  data 
of  the  senses  in  the  same  proper  order  for  his  intellect. .  ."'^'^ 
Who  would  not  plainly  recognize  here  the  teachings  of 
Condillac?  Or  again:  "The  senses  are  the  first  faculties 
which  form  themselves,  and  perfect  themselves  in  us.  They 
are  the  first,  therefore,  which  one  ought  to  cultivate;  they 
are  the  only  ones  ever  forgotten,  or  those  most  neg- 
lected..  ."^^  "In  the  first  operations  of  the  mind,  let  the 
senses  be  guides..  .";^^  and  so  forth.  The  theory  finally 
assumed  a  rather  peculiar  form  in  one  of  his  last  writings, 
the  Dialogues,  but  even  then  physiological  psychology  is 
not  given  up,  but  only  transformed,  or,  better,  restricted 
considerably.     (Cf.  CEuvres  IX,  p.  196.) 

It  is  a  question  whether  Rousseau  ever  read  the  Traite 
des  sensations.  After  1749,  he  no  longer  lived  near  the 
opera  house  on  the  rue  Jean-Saint-Denis,  but  in  his  own 
home  on  the  rue  de  Grenelle-Saint-Honore,  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent quarter  (p.  298).  However  he  says  that  he  was 
still  on  very  friendly  terms  with  Condillac.  The  latter  left 
Paris  for  Italy  in  1756.  One  great  difficulty  regarding  the 
question  as  to  whether  Rousseau  had  or  had  not  read  the 
Traite  des  sensations,  and  which  inclines  one  towards  the 

*•  Book  I,  cf.  CEuvres  II,  pp.  32-33. 
**  Book  II,  cf.  CEuvres  II,  p.  102. 
*•  Book  III,  cf.  CEuvres  II,  p.  138. 


36  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

negative,  is  that  in  1758  Rousseau  discussed  Helvetius's 
idea  of  reducing  judgment  to  sensation  as  if  he  thought 
that  materialistic  ideas  had  never  been  represented  in  that 
way  before  in  France.  Yet  if  he  had  read  the  Traite  des 
sensations  he  would  have  known  that  it  is  explained  there 
in  very  similar  terms  (see,  e.  g.,  Part  I,  chap.  VII)  ;  and 
again  Rousseau  (CEuvres  II,  242)  suggests  an  objection 
to  "sensualism"  in  the  same  year,  1758,  which  Condillac 
had  refuted  at  length  in  Part  III  of  the  Traite. 

The  abbe  de  Condillac  was,  by  nature,  a  man  of  altru- 
istic temperament;  and  therefore  he  never  allowed  his 
scientific  theories,  even  the  most  radical  ones  of  the  Traite 
des  sensations,  to  influence  his  ethical  views  in  a  material- 
istic fashion,  as  other  writers  of  the  time,  such  as  the  En- 
cyclopedists, most  decidedly  did.  And  this  no  doubt  is  one 
of  the  reasons  why  Rousseau  found  him  so  congenial. 
Neither  is  there  any  doubt  on  the  other  hand,  that  logically 
his  scientific  views  of  the  Traite  des  sensations  ought  to 
have  taken  him  to  the  positions  which  writers  like  Hel- 
vetius  took  in  ethical  matters ;  a  proof  of  it  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  if  he  did  not  draw  the  conclusion  himself,  the 
public  did.  In  our  own  days  Condillac  is  more  or  less 
misjudged  as  a  "materialist"  in  the  moral  sense,  which 
indeed  he  never  wanted  to  be.  Rousseau  was  more  cau- 
tious; he  foresaw  the  danger  and  refused  to  indulge  in 
further  development  of  the  ideas  of  the  sensualists,  al- 
though it  would  have  been  more  consistent  theoretically. 
He  was  concerned  more  with  the  consequences  of  the  doc- 
trines than  with  the  doctrines  themselves.*^  But  let  us  not 
anticipate  further  development,  but  bear  this  in  mind  for 
the  present :  Rousseau,  at  the  time  when  he  had  become  the 
friend  of  Condillac  and  of  the  Encyclopedists,  may  be  said 

"  The  same  relation  could  be  shown  to  exist  between  Condillac  and  Rous- 
seau which  I  have  tried  to  show  between  Dewey  and  James  in  my  book  Anti- 
Pragmatisme.  See  also  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Nov.  5,  1908.  Dewey  is  more 
anxious  for  a  good  philosophical  argument  in  pragmatism,  James  more  con- 
cerned with  the  pragmatic  consequences  of  philosophical  principles. 


ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  37 

to  have  been  dazzled  by  the  new  ideas  brought  over  from 
England,  and  thus  came  near  missing  his  vocation  as  a 
moral  reformer  and  inspirer  of  the  French  Revolution. 
This  vocation,  or  at  least  the  realization  in  his  mind  of  this 
vocation  seems  to  have  come  upon  him  rather  suddenly, 
at  the  time  when  he  wrote  his  first  Discourse  (1749),  al- 
though it  must  be  admitted  that  what  we  might  call  the 
pragmatic  paradox  (of  making  ethical  usefulness  the  cri- 
terion of  philosophic  truth)  had  been  budding  within  him 
long  before.  See,  for  example,  his  early  drama  La  de- 
couverte  du  nouveau  monde  (1740). 


APPENDIX  II. 

Rousseau  and  Madame  de  Genlis. 

(See  note  14,  page  7.) 

It  has  been  thought  by  a  very  loyal  admirer  of  Rous- 
seau— and  others  have  repeated  it  after  him — that  we  have 
further  details  regarding  La  morale  sensitive  from  Mme. 
de  Genlis.^''  But  this  is  erroneous.  In  reading  the  account 
Mme.  de  Genlis  gives  in  the  preface  to  her  novel  Alphonsine, 
one  will  notice  that  she  employs  exactly  the  same  terms  used 
by  Rousseau  in  his  Confessions,  only  interspersing  them 
with  bits  of  explanatory  phrases  to  render  things  clearer, 
as  she  thinks.  And  even  in  the  fifth  edition  of  1825,  which 
was  published  during  the  lifetime  of  the  author,  the  quota- 
tions are  all  carefully  underlined  (instead  of  using  quota- 
tion marks),  which  indicates  plainly  that  Alme.  de  Genlis 
did  not  claim  to  have  any  other  information  directly  from 
Rousseau.  Moreover,  Rousseau  was  putting  down  notes 
for  this  book  in  the  years  1756  to  1757;  now  it  is  pretty 
sure  that  he  did  not  see  Mme.  de  Genlis  at  that  time. 
They  might  have  met  at  the  residence  of  M.  de  la  Pope- 

**  See  Musset-Pathay,   Vie  et  ouvrages  de.  J. -J.  Rousseau,  Vol.   IT,  pp. 
466-470. 


16';'818 


38  ROUSSEAU,  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

liniere;  but  Rousseau  visited  there  chiefly  in  1748;  and 
when  Madame  de  Genlis  came  to  that  house,  it  was  in  1761, 
when  she  was  13  years  old.  Even  if  she  had  chanced  to 
meet  Rousseau  once  or  twice  before  he  left  for  Switzerland 
— which  is  highly  improbable — it  is  not  likely  that  Rous- 
seau would  have  discussed  so  grave  a  subject  with  so  young 
a  person.  It  is  true  that  Mme.  de  Genlis  in  her  Memoires 
de  Felicie  states  that  she  was  eighteen  when  she  first  met 
Rousseau,  but  such  defects  of  memory  will  happen  to  ladies, 
for  she  was  24,  and  it  was  during  Rousseau's  second  long 
stay  in  Paris  ( 1770- 1778)  that  she  saw  a  good  deal  of  him, 
how  much  is  not  ascertained  yet,  for  there  are  inaccuracies 
in  the  account.^^  Did  Rousseau  discuss  the  Morale  sensi- 
tive with  her  then?  Here  again  it  seems  doubtful.  She 
herself  admits  that  Rousseau  thought  her  too  young  to  be 
told  about  the  Confessions ;  the  same  argument  in  this  case 
would  hold  for  a  book  that  might  be  so  easily  misunder- 
stood by  youthful  feminine  brains.  Further  we  are  inclined 
to  think  that  Rousseau  did  not  speak  much  of  this  book  at 
that  time  anyway;  in  fact  he  did  not  even  mention  it  to 
Bernardin  de  Saint  Pierre,  who  gathered  from  Rousseau's 
own  lips  a  list  of  the  books  which  the  latter  had  intended  to 
write.'** 

APPENDIX  III. 

An  Unknown  Phase  of  Rousseau's  Thought. 

(See  note  37,  page  32.) 

In  the  continuation  which  Rousseau  had  planned  to 
write  for  Emile,  (the  plan  of  which  has  been  recently  given 
to  us  in  the  new  edition  of  Bernardin  de  Saint  Pierre's  Vie 
et  ouvrages  de  J.  J.  Rousseau,  pp.  169  ff.)  we  see  a  new 
phase  of  development  in  his  ideas,  and  perhaps  we  may 

*"  Mme.  de  Genlis  says  six  months,  but  it  must  be  six  weeks — another  inno- 
cent httle  untruth  which  we  are  not  particularly  surprised  to  find  in  the  mem- 
oirs of  a  lady  who  is  rather  proud  of  her  acquaintances  with  great  men. 

'*  See  Vie  et  ouvrages  de  J.  J.  Rousseau,  ed.  Souriau,  1907,  pp.  150  ff. 


ROUSSEAU^  A  FORERUNNER  OF  PRAGMATISM.  39 

guess  one  of  the  solutions  which  he  might  finally  have 
reached  if  he  had  continued  to  devote  attention  to  the  diffi- 
culties alluded  to  in  the  preceding  quotations.  We  are 
taken  to  an  island  where  a  good  old  man  and  a  pretty  girl, 
thrown  there  by  shipwreck,  are  performing  miracles  for 
the  sailors  who  seek  refuge  at  times  on  their  shores;  the 
sailors  are  rendered  happy  because  they  are  made  to  think 
that  the  Virgin  herself  is  coming  to  their  rescue  and  help- 
ing them.  They  do  not  know  of  the  two  Crusoes,  and 
whenever  a  storm  forces  them  to  take  refuge  in  the  island 
they  find  baskets  of  fruit  awaiting  them  in  a  grotto,  before 
a  statue  of  Mary.  The  girl  takes  advantage  of  the  echoes 
of  the  rugged  place  to  make  the  people  believe  that  four 
angels  are  singing  for  them  celestial  hymns,  the  voices 
seeming  to  come  from  four  different  parts  of  the  island  at 
the  same  time.  Rousseau  seems  to  praise  highly  these 
pious  deceptions.  In  other  words,  science  used  by  this 
intelligent  girl  is  rendered  beneficent  for  the  simple-minded 
sailors,  for  the  class  of  men  who,  if  they  had  science  at 
their  disposal,  might  apply  it  to  wrong  purposes  and  only 
increase  by  it  their  power  for  evil.  Or  again  in  other 
words:  Rousseau  seems  to  be  here  in  favor  of  pragmatic 
ignorance  for  the  masses,  while  holding  that  for  the  select 
few,  science  is  desirable  and  desirable  in  the  interest  of  all : 
that  sounds  quite  different  from  the  original  theory. 


\ 


I 


>,     '7 


Fi 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


> 


315 


I  ^   ^^58  00118' 1840 


AA    000  796  725 


H 


